Russian acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea can hardly be prevented – News

The Baltic Sea is increasingly developing into a silent theater of war. A few days ago, another underwater line was destroyed, this time a power line between Finland and Estonia. And: This time too, Russia seems to be behind it – at least that’s what Finland says. A classification by the SRF correspondent for international security, Fredy Gsteiger.

Fredy Gsteiger is a diplomatic correspondent and deputy editor-in-chief at Radio SRF. Before working on radio, he was a foreign editor at “St. Galler Tagblatt”, Middle East editor and Paris correspondent for “Zeit” and editor-in-chief of “Weltwoche”.

Here you will find further articles by Fredy Gsteiger and information about him.

What evidence suggests Russian involvement?

There is a Russian interest in such acts of sabotage. Moscow wants to inflict damage on the other states bordering the Baltic Sea, all of which are members of NATO. This is also a retaliation for their support for Ukraine. And Moscow wants to demonstrate its power. Russia also has the opportunity to cut and destroy such deep-sea cables or pipelines. And: No other riparian state has an interest in damaging the deep-sea infrastructure. Moscow’s newest instrument is now ships from its shadow fleet. These are estimated at over 1,000 ships and were originally intended to circumvent sanctions and enable Russia to export oil.

Man in dark jacket clapping behind microphones. — Legend:

Russian ruler Putin is allowing hundreds of old ships to sail in order to circumvent the sanctions. Recently, some of them have been suspected of sabotage.

Reuters

Even without acts of sabotage, Russia’s shadow fleet is problematic: they are old ships that are poorly or not at all insured and are ecologically questionable. And they are often registered in flag states – like Gabon or, in this specific case, the Cook Islands. These countries cannot guarantee control or monitoring.

How vulnerable are the NATO states to sabotage?

As for the undersea cables and pipelines: very vulnerable. This deep-sea infrastructure has become an art backbone or lifeline of a modern, globalized society. Data, electricity, oil and gas are transported there. These cables are a total of 1.3 million kilometers long worldwide and are often only a few centimeters thick. In addition, the Baltic Sea is a shallow body of water and is only around 50 meters deep on average. You can also do damage there very easily, even without submarines.

On December 25, a malfunction occurred on an undersea power cable between Estonia and Finland. The “EstLink 2” connection was then taken offline. A day later, a Finnish investigator arrests the oil tanker “Eagle S” with the help of a special team. The ship sails under the flag of the Cook Islands. And according to the Financial Times, the freighter is linked to the Russian shadow fleet. According to Finnish investigators, the damage to the cable could have been caused by the anchor. The repair would take several months. The electricity supply in Finland is still stable – but the situation could worsen if there is a little less wind.

In November, damage to two fiber optic cables in the Baltic Sea occurred within a short period of time. This involved a cable that runs between Sweden and Lithuania and one between Finland and Germany. The cause of this is still unclear – but the Swedish authorities are investigating possible sabotage. The investigators’ focus is on a Chinese ship called “Yi Peng 3”, which is said to have passed the affected areas of the cables at the time in question. Previously, a gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia was severely damaged last year.

As a result of the events in the Baltic Sea region, Estonia and NATO have now announced that they want to increase their military patrols in the area in question.
(sda)

Can the cables be protected?

This is very difficult. They could be laid deep in the seabed, encased in concrete or provided with steel casings, which is what is being done in some cases. But that is very expensive. Or, as is now planned, they could be monitored better with patrols, coast guard, navy, helicopter flights, airplanes. But that also required enormous resources.

Are there legal remedies against sabotage?

These are very limited. The flag states would be responsible for prosecution if such ships were destroyed. But in the case of the Russian Shadow Fleet, it is unrealistic for them to actually act. The UN maritime law UNCLOS gives states relatively extensive rights in their territorial waters within the twelve-mile zone. Furthermore, these are international waters. Since there are no powers to stop, detain, inspect ships or question the crew. This was recently seen in another case of sabotage involving the Chinese ship “Yi Peng 3,” which in the end was simply able to continue sailing.

Can’t you change the rules?

Many states would like to tighten controls, but adapting maritime law would be complex and time-consuming. And it could also have delicate consequences because other states would then take advantage of these new control powers. For example, China could hinder or even prevent maritime traffic to Taiwan. There is also a high probability that such acts of sabotage against deep-sea infrastructure will only increase. And they are an effective and cheap form of hybrid warfare against the West for Russia.